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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 15384
LARRY KYLE STEPHENS and
TROY JOHNSON,
Defendants and
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft,

Utah Code

Annotated §76-6-501(1953) as amended, a second degree felony.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried before the Court sitting without
a jury on July 19, 1977, wherein the Defendants were found
guilty.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the lower court
reversed or vacated and the case remanded with directions
to enter a judgment of not guilty.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the 4th day of December, 1976, Grant Mathews, a mink
rancher
Utah,
foundprovided
theby the
hinges
of his
shed
door
Sponsored from
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at his ranch removed and 75 frozen mink pelts missing from a
storage freezer inside.

(T.R. 25).

These pelts were placed

there in plastic bags with each bag containing 25 graded
pelts together with approximately 700 pelts to be taken to
Orem, Utah for final preparation for market.

These

pelts

and bags were not marked except each contained Mathew's
card.

(T.R. 31 and 54)

Mathews records showed the missing

75 pelts were all male with the coloration graded as 67
pastel and 8 demi-buff.

(T.R. 61)

Mathews further testifiec

that the Defendants had worked for him for a short time and
were terminated about 10 days before the loss was discovered.
(T.R. 39).

The officers could find no evidence at the scene

to identify the person or persons involved (T.R. 76-77)
On a tip, the deputies from the Cache County Sheriff's
office went to Shamrock Coins, a pawnshop in Pocatello, the
end of April, 1977 and talked with the owner, Dan Williamson.
He told them that two boys came into his pawn shop to sell
two plastic bags containing 75 mink pelts on the 9th day of
December, 1976.

(T.R. 81)

He bought the pelts which he

identified the color as mostly a light color platinum with
three black ones.

(T.R. 84).

He sent the pelts to Wilkinson

Pelting Service in Orem, Utah on December 20, 1976 (T.R.
113)

who graded the 75 pelts as 61 pastel, ll demi-buff and

three other mutations.

(See Exhibit 9).

These were in turn

delivered to and sold by the Seattle Fur Exchange with the
pelt description and sex listed (See Exhibits 10 and 11).
The pelts were not available at trial.

\lilliamson and his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

wife were shown pictures of the defendants with others but
could not identify the defendants.

(TR. 99).

At trial

however, the witness Dan Williamson did identify the defendant
Troy Johnson but could not identify the defendant Kyle
Stephens.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CHARGES
AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, A GUILTY
VERDICT ON CHARGES OF THEFT.
It is well recognized law that the burden of proof in
criminal cases is on the State to prove each and every
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and the
defendant is entitled to any benefit of reasonable doubt.
Potter v.

u.s.,

155

u.s.

438, 39 L Ed. 214, 15

s.

Ct. 144

(1894) State v. Taylor, 21 U. 2d 4.25, 446 P. 2d 954 (1968).
In Utah, the standard for a reasonable doubt is specifically
set forth in State v. Williamson, 22 Utah 248 62 Pac. 1022,
(1900):
"A reasonable doubt is not a mere imaginary,
captious or possible doubt but be fair doubt based
upon reason and common sense, and growing out of testimony
in the case.
It is such a doubt as will leave the juror's
mind, after a careful examination of all the evidence,
in such a condition that he cannot say that he has an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
defendant's guilt." p. 1024
This uncertainty of mind is one arising from a defect of
knowledge or evidence and is one, if honestly entertained,
which is a reasonable doubt.

Williamson, supra, at 1024.
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In the instant case, the Court sitting as a jury, found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellants were guilty of the
theft of 75 mink pelts.

Appellants respectfully submit that

there is insufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as defined in Utah law.
were sold

The pelts which

in Idaho were never identified beyond a reasonablE

doubt, as those pelts taken from Grant Mathew's shed.
In Utah, the State must identify stolen property as the
goods which are charged to have been stolen.

The rule is

set forth in State v. Hall, 105 U. 151, 139 P. 2d 228 (1943)
reversed on other
(1943),

groun~s

in 105 U. 162, 145 P. 2d 494

in which the defendant was charged with stealing

spark plugs.
Under the authorities, it is clear that the State
must definately identify the goods found in the Defendant's possess1on as the goods which were charged to
have been stolen before the jury may draw an inference
of guilt based upon the proof of possession by the
defendant of such goods.
Hall, supra, at p. 230
(emphasis added).
---In that case, there was no evidence that anyone saw the
Defendant or anyone else take the spark

plugs.

The State

therefore, as here, relied entirely on circumstantial eviden:
to prove all elements of the crime.

The facts adduced were

that two shipments of plugs were missing within six weeks,
that not all of the shipments were missing, that the defendt
was allegedly selling spark plugs at a discount price, and
that the defendant had access to the area of the theft.

ThE

State was unable to identity the plugs as those stolen
during
one
theft
particularly
onprovided
theby thesecond
dateand Library
tne Services
spark
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were missing.

This court stated that "proof in the alternative

that they were either the ones stolen on May 23rd or part of
the shipment which was stolen some six weeks earlier, will not
suffice."

Hall, supra, at 231.

As a matter of law, the State

had failed to prove the plugs were taken on May 23rd and the
case was remanded for a new trial.
Similarly, the 75 mink pelts in the instant case were
not sufficiently identified under the above rule of law.
The Court near the end of the trial, in response to objection
of defense counsel that as a question of whether the pelts
described in Mathew's original records could fit the
description in the Wilkinson and

Sea~tle

Fur Exchange's invoices

was too speculative stated:
"This is too speculative, the whole thing has been
in the same category"

(T.R. 211)

The lower court itself then in rending his verdict stated that
testimony concerning identification is purely speculative.
The Court:
In this case, first of all as to the identity
of the stolen property, mink of course are not branded like
cattle and have a distinct different brand mark on them, but
certainly by the circumstantial evidence you have 75 mink missing
and 75 mink turn up at a place where one of the defendants is
identified as being present and selling the mink, and of the
same general description.
I understand there's been a lot of
testimony here about descriptions and colorations and gradings
of mink pelts and about what I've learned in not only this
case but others as far as mink grading is concerned is that
this generally fits in about the same category of expertise as
far as agreement among themselves as appraisers and surveyors
and weather prognosticator.
(T.R. 215 and 216.)
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Out of pages of testimony, the lower court could credit th,
experts with only a minimal degree of consistency which in
listening to the testimony is understandable.

The Court

described very clearly the lack of certainty with which the
pelts were identified.

Grant Mathews readily changed his

initial identification of coloration from 67 pastel and
8 demi-buff (T.R. 30) to be the same as the coloration
established in Exhibit 9 by Wilkinson Pelting Service and in
Exhibit 10 and 11 by Seattle Fur Exchange.

Lynn Erickson,

an expert witness without any self interest, agreed that
some disagreement may be made in grading coloration and size
but was clear that a luletia pelt graded by Seattle fur Exchr
in Exhibit 10 and 11 and consistent with "other mutations" by
Wilkinson in Exhibit 9 would not be mistaken for a demi-buff
or pastel.

(T.R. 186)

Even if one accepts the

inconsisten~

in coloration grades as being merely graders' opinion, there
one pelt sold in Pocatello that is totally inconsistent with'
color gradation of the pelts taken from Mathews.
This evidence does not comprise definite identification.
fact, the only evidence that the pelts missing from the
Mathews shed were those sold to Williamson in Pocatello was t
fact that they were the same number.
In addition to the critical difference in color, other evi
was contradictory to the State's case:

11

the mink pelts taken from Mathews were in three
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bags but the mink sold in Pocatello were in two bags (T.R.
81) and still more could have been put in each bag (T.R.
99). Grant Mathews testified that 30 of his male pelts in
one of his bags is very crowded (T.R. 11).
2)

Grant Mathews indicated that the pelts would have

to be kept frozen to preserve their quality.
affirmed by Lynn Erickson (T.R.

(T.R. 35) and

206) The pelts were sold

fully seven days after the alleged theft in a cooled but not
frozen condition to Dan Williamson without any spoilage.
3)

Grant Mathews reported the theft to the local co-op

with a reward which would have been reported to Wilkinson
(T.R.

33, 34 and 39), but Wilkinson did not report anything when

75 pelts were received from a non co-op member, namely, a pawnshop, just over two weeks later.

If Mathews identification is

so clear from invoices why did Wilkinson not note the connection
unless the coloration from Mathews' report and that observed by
Wilkinson were clearly different.
4)

The mink pelts of Mathews are only a small number of

over 25,000 pelts prepared in Cache Valley the same time (T.R.
66) with saw dust and in bags available to any co-op member
(T. R. 31).

There is no evidence of where defendant's were working

after termination with Grant Mathews or whether other mink pelts
were missing or not missing in the area during the same time.
5)

The State could not prove Appellants' employment provided

them with any special information regarding the mink storage.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In

fact, Mr. Mathews testified that most of the mink pelts were,
mulated a few days before the break-in and he had planned to
the pelts to Orem the night in question but did not do so beca
he was tired (T.R. 43-44).

It

lS

submitted that Appellants m

being current employees would not know the pelt count on the
premises.

In fact,

they would only know where pelts were kept

and that they were removed often.
Further, in consideration of the above points and the
entire record, where the alleged offense and the accuseds'
alleged connection therewith "rest wholly upon circumstantial
evidence which evidence, as a matter of law, is reasonably
consistent with the innocence of the accused, then this
Court must hold that there

is not substantial evidence to

support the guilt of the accused."
414, 115 P. 2d 911,

State v. Burch, 100 Utah

(1941).

The lower court could not base its decision on one
shred of direct evidence. By admission, the Court had to
rely on circumstantial evidence alone.

(T.R.

216

217).

Such evidence must be viewed with caution and 1t must ~
every reasonable hypothesis except the guilty of the defendar
state v. Romero,

554 P.

2d 216

not overcome this burden ot

(Utah, 1976).

The State d1d

proof.
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In addition, the State presented evidence which is not
substantial.
Stephens'

Based on the testimony concerning Appellant

alleged declaration against his interest, the

lower court erred in relying on said testimony to reach its
verdict.

On page 149 of the trial transcript, the Court

sustained a motion of defense counsel to strike the testimony
of arresting officer Stauffer with regard to Appellant
Johnson's testimony.
The Court:
I don't know, unless there can be some
relationship to that, you can't tell from the warrant
what's being referred to, and the only testimony I
got here is that it could be the warrant, it could
be- if its the warrant, you can't relate it to any
specific event, or certainly not the event they're
charges with.
I would, therefore, sustain the motion.
(T.R. 149 1. 7-13)
Appellants submit that for this same reasoning, the
testimony of Officer Alan Nelson is not admissible.

On

cross examination by defense counsel, Nelson responded to
questions concerning the arrest:
A.
Approached the subject on the sidewalk, told
him that they had a warrant for his arrest charging
him with four felony counts.
Q.
Okay.
Now was Officer Williamson present all
during this time?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okey.

Or yes, 1·\a'am.

A.
And he said, "What for?" and I says, "I don't
I says,
"something to do
know what they're all for,"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-9-

with a burglary and some thefts of some furs."
.•. We placed him in the car, drove him to the station,
and deputies served the warrant on him and booked him
into the jail.

Q.
Okay.
At the time that you were arresting him
did he at any time request the warrant to be shown
to him?

A.

No, Ma'am.

(T.R. 178, 1. 5-24)

Appellant Stephens at the time of arrest had no knowledge of
the events with which he is charged.

Officer Nelson admitted

he had no written warrant of arrest and did not know one of
the four charges included forgery (T.R. 177).

The Officers hi

notes but relied completely on memory which was not clear.
(T.R. 164)

In fact,

it was not until Stephens arrived at

the station to be booked that he was actually informed of
the specific charges against him.

This testimony is clearly

not substantial evidence upon which a guilty verdict may be
predicated, especially in light of the lack of direct

eviden~

against Appellants.
In a criminal prosecution, the State is required to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt and by substantial
evidence that the accused are guilty of a crime, and where
proof is made by circumstantial evidence, it must be so made
as to exclude all uncertainty or doubt of Defendant's guilt.
State v. Sullivan,

34 Idaho 68, 199, Pac. 647, 17 ALR 902

(lo

The State here failed to produce evidence to sustain its burc
of proof.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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The police officers knew that they roust prove each
element beyond a reasonable doubt but the evidence identifying
the stolen goods is very weak and certainly not enough to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

Difficulty for

the State in proving elements of its case should only require
them to work harder and not serve as a license to waive basic
constitution rights.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE
WAS INSUFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION OF THE
APPELLANTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALLEGED
THEFT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The only evidence against the Appellant, Larry Kyle Stephens,
was:

1) he was employed by Grant Mathews for a short time of

approximately ten days before the break-in; 2) a handwriting
expert testified but he endorsed the check given to the boys by
Dan Williamson;

3) he may have been one of the boys in the pawn-

shop; and 4) admissions made at the time of his arrest.
The employment did not terminate with any hard feelings
(T.R.

39)

and as set forth in Point I that employment gave him

no special knowledge of when pelts would be there or shipped to
Orem for fleshing.

This factor should be given very little

weight by the Court.
Even assuming that a handwriting expert's testimony can be
sufficient evidence alone, the State produced no evidence as to
·.,'1\<_·n, whL'lC,

or-

under whilt circumstances the Appellilnt, Larry Kyle
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Stephens, may have endorsed the check in guestion.

The check.

presented for payment in Utah without evidence of who presente:
The identity of Appellant, Larry Kyle Stephens, by Dan
Williamson was extremely weak (T.R.

81).

This was after he ha

been presented with a picture of Appellant Larry Kyle Stephens
by Officer Crockett, which he could not identify (T.R. 165).
is indeed strange that Williamson could not identify Appellant
Stephens by picture in April but could remember and identify h
in Court in July, three months later.

Mr. Williamson's

test~

can best be surrunarized by his own statement, "It's so hard to
remember, it's been so long ago."

(T.R.

Mrs. Williamson

86).

also present in the shop on December 9, 1976, could not ident:
the Appellants from the pictures in late April or at Court (T.
108) .

The so-called admissions were excluded properly and
be part of the record as set forth in Point I.

ca~

Each Appellar,-

was initially charged with four felonies and Defendant Larry
Stephens was arrested without a written warrant.
arresting officer knew the exact charges.

Not even th·

The trial court

1-1h·

faced with the objection by counsel to exclude testimony of

i

similar nature by Appellant Johnson properly held it not relE
because the Appellant did not have enough information or defl
enough statement for the admission to have any meaning.
Admittedly the testimony identifying the Appellant Tr~
Johnson is slightly stronger because he

Wds

identi t 1ed by Da'

Williamson and his handwritinr; identification would }->lace h1:
the shop with the mink ?Clts, but bdsr·cl un the po1nls raisec
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1n

l . . I r l l \·.

pictures, this evidence is not sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt Appellant Troy Johnson's involvement in theft.
CONCLUSION
A case determined solely on circumstantial evidence must
be

approached with highest scrutiny as afforded by law.

If there

is a reasonable hypothesis resulting from the evidence which is
consistent with Appellants' innocence, there naturally follows
a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.
The state has not proven the essential element of the
crime with which Appellants are charged:

(~)

that Appellants

exercised unauthorized control over the stolen property, and
(2) that the property they allegedly had was, in fact, stolen
from Grant Mathews.

Based on all the testimony at trial, there

exists a reasonable doubt as to Appellants' guilt.
For the reasons stated above, Appellants' pray that the
verdict of the lower court be reversed and the case be dismissed
for lack of sufficient evidence, or that it be remanded with
directions to enter a judgment of not guilty.
Respectfully submitted,
HILLYARD, GUNNELL & LOW
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